
For outstanding achievement in making a major technology failure sound reassuring.
There should be an awards ceremony for incident communications.
Best Supporting Software Bug. Most Unexpected Maintenance Window. Outstanding Achievement in Describing a Nationwide Disruption as an Isolated Issue.
After the last several days, the competition would be fierce.
Microsoft. The FAA. Banking services. Apple. The NSA’s internal communications network. Meanwhile, ransomware claims involving Visa and JPMorgan Chase have added another layer of concern to an already crowded news cycle.
For those of us responsible for keeping systems available and protecting the people who use them, it has been quite a week.
And yes, I am skeptical. I was when this all began last week. And I’ve become even more so this week. I’m still calling BS.
I have spent enough years in IT and cybersecurity to understand that the first public explanation deserves scrutiny. An early statement reflects what an organization knows, and is prepared to say… at that moment. It is not automatically the final forensic conclusion.
Experience gives us reasons to ask questions. It also gives us a responsibility to follow the evidence, including when it challenges our first impression.
The nominees…
Microsoft’s November 12 outage disrupted Microsoft 365 services worldwide. Its preliminary explanation describes a latent software defect, increased traffic following a Teams failover, and reduced server capacity combining into a cascading failure. Microsoft has attributed the incident to technical causes. www.bleepingcomputer.com
The FAA’s November 13 nationwide ground stop followed a telecommunications disruption. Its published explanation points to instability involving legacy infrastructure and router functionality. The agency says it has found no indication of a cyberattack or outside malicious actor. www.faa.gov
JPMorgan attributed its November 16 transaction delays to a software bug affecting on-premises hardware. It said slower transactions could affect other banks receiving them and reported no evidence that the disruption was cyber-related. www.investing.com
Apple attributed its November 17 service disruption to an internal update and said it was not caused by a cyberattack. www.reuters.com
The NSA’s internal classified communications network also suffered an outage. CNN reported that sources had found no evidence of a cyberattack at that point. www.kq2.com
Those are the stated explanations, and they belong in the record.
So do the questions.
A familiar spectator sport…
Among the security professionals I compare notes with, there’s a familiar ritual when these incidents unfold: we sit back, listen, and see how well the first explanation holds up.
The carefully chosen language, creative explanations, apparent deflections, and statements that sound definitive while leaving enough room for a substantial revision next Tuesday.
There’s a certain professional amusement in watching that choreography. We’ve spent years working incidents, reviewing logs, and asking these questions. We listen closely to what is said, what remains unanswered, and how the wording changes as findings emerge.
The amusement is reserved for the messaging. There is nothing entertaining about employees losing access to their tools, travelers being stranded, or people wondering whether their money and personal information are safe.
We also know the difference between an investigation uncovering new facts and a spokesperson getting ahead of the evidence.
Sometimes a software bug really is a software bug. Sometimes the explanation needs another chapter. The entertainment is in the messaging; the conclusion still has to come from the evidence.
And when a confident early assurance eventually gives way to a breach disclosure, you can almost hear the collective sigh from the security crowd… “Now, about that original statement…”
Whether any of these current incidents follows that path remains to be established.
Visa adds a different kind of headline…
Alongside the outages, the n0n ransomware group listed Visa and JPMorgan Chase as alleged victims.
According to Cybernews, Visa acknowledged an incident involving a third-party provider in the Asia-Pacific region. Visa said its own systems were unaffected and that there was no indication payment-card data had been affected. JPMorgan’s alleged breach remained unconfirmed in that reporting, and no connection between the ransomware claim and its transaction outage had been established. cybernews.com
A criminal group’s victim listing is an allegation requiring verification. An incident at a service provider has a different scope from a compromise of a company’s own systems. A transaction outage, by itself, does not demonstrate data theft.
Each deserves investigation. Combining them prematurely makes the picture less accurate.
Apple’s security updates deserve the same discipline. Apple has published recent vulnerability fixes, but those advisories do not establish that its service outage resulted from exploitation. A vulnerability disclosure and an outage investigation answer different questions. support.apple.com
Why the explanations still deserve (serious) scrutiny…
When I hear that a routine update caused a major outage, my next questions concern the controls around that update.
What did testing cover? How closely did the test environment resemble production? How far could the change spread before someone stopped it? Did rollback work? Were dependencies understood? Had recovery been tested under the conditions that actually occurred?
Having a test environment does not guarantee that testing captures every production condition. That makes representative testing, controlled deployment, monitoring, and workable recovery procedures essential subjects for the incident review.
When I hear that infrastructure could not handle the load, I want to understand the expected failure conditions and why available capacity, traffic controls, or recovery mechanisms did not contain the impact.
These are reasonable questions even if every stated cause proves completely accurate.
A technical explanation can be true and still expose serious weaknesses in design, testing, change management, or recovery.
Calling something a “glitch” does very little for the people responsible for explaining why their business stopped functioning.
“No evidence” needs context…
I pay close attention to the phrase “no evidence of a cyberattack.”
It can be an accurate, responsible statement. Its significance depends on the investigation behind it.
Which systems have been examined? What period do the available logs cover? Have third-party access paths been reviewed? Is the assessment preliminary? What remains unresolved?
An organization does not need to publish sensitive investigative details to explain the scope and confidence of its assessment.
There is also a meaningful difference between finding no evidence so far and completing an investigation that supports ruling out malicious activity. Public communications should make that distinction clear.
An evolving explanation deserves careful reading, too. New findings can reflect legitimate investigative progress. A correction can reveal that an earlier statement was too confident. Neither possibility should be decided in advance.
If an organization later confirms malicious activity, its earlier assurances should be examined against what it knew when it issued them.
Until then, we should resist writing the ending ourselves.
Hmm… Are these events connected?
The timing makes the question understandable, but unfortunately, it does not supply the answer.
A credible connection requires evidence… shared compromised infrastructure, a common affected provider, matching indicators, a demonstrated attack path, or investigative findings that link the incidents.
Several organizations experiencing problems within days of one another is a reason to investigate possible relationships. It is not (yet) enough to establish a coordinated campaign.
Independent failures, shared dependencies, malicious activity in particular cases, or some combination could produce a crowded week of alarming headlines. Those possibilities need to be tested against the facts.
My experience makes me suspicious of premature certainty… including my own.
I question these public explanations. I am equally willing to revise my view when the evidence warrants it. That is the standard I expect from the organizations involved.
The award nobody should want
If the investigations ultimately support the technical explanations, there is still a difficult story here.
Critical services can suffer enormous disruption from software defects, maintenance, capacity constraints, and failed recovery mechanisms. An incident does not need a hostile actor to expose a dangerous weakness.
If investigations uncover attacks, the questions become different: how access occurred, what was affected, how long the activity persisted, and whether public statements accurately reflected the available findings.
Either outcome calls for accountability.
For security and technology leaders, the practical work continues while those answers emerge: review dependencies, scrutinize privileged access, validate recovery procedures, and make sure employees know how to report suspicious messages and unexpected sign-in requests.
We should also demand useful post-incident reporting. What failed? Why did safeguards fail to contain it? What changed? How will the organization verify that those changes work?
“Services have been restored” answers an immediate operational question. Customers also deserve to understand why they should have confidence in the next recovery.
As for the award?
I’ll reserve my vote until the incident reports arrive.
The winning explanation should be the one that survives scrutiny. But, don’t hold your breathe!





